I read that famed biologist E.O. Wilson provoked a tempest by claiming a genetic basis for social cooperation that has the politically unfortunate side-effect of undermining a widely embraced explanation for the persistence of homosexuality.
If he’s right, we’re stuck with an uncomfortable reality that homosexuality is a choice, or a learned behavior, or something that sounds equally unsavory in the parlors of the enlightened.
I don’t have a dog in that hunt, but I confess I enjoy seeing scientists upset. Whenever you stumble upon a coven of them inveighing against a line of inquiry, you can be fairly certain there’s something worth inquiring after. Discoveries are frequently advanced by heretics, after all, and reviled, up until the very last, by the keepers of orthodoxy.
The reason expert denunciation should draw one’s attention is that very few of us like to be wrong. Fewer still like to stand shivering beyond the glow of tribal fires. A thinker will only stand lonely and shivering, therefore, if he really is convinced he has glimpsed something to indicate that the campfire needs to be dragged, ember by brand, in his direction.
Dogma guardians, meanwhile, only assemble to denounce him when, deep down, they worry he may be right. You ignore the crazy man at the back of the bus, but you argue with the colleague who says your math is wrong (and if this isn’t true of you, then you may yourself be a crazy person—or perhaps you are my eleven year-old, who will cheerfully argue with a fencepost if I let him).
Wherever experts gather to hurl opprobrium, in other words, has often been precisely where a newly discerned truth is emerging.
Michael Polanyi, a chemist before the Second World War, wrote about this phenomenon in his densely packed Personal Knowledge. Repulsed by the utilitarian, centralized approach to science of thuggish German and Russian regimes, Polanyi became a philosopher of science, and a staunch advocate for creative freedom.
One of Polanyi’s many insights is that much essential knowledge is tacit, and a product of engaging with, rather than simply analyzing, the world.
Tacit knowledge is one reason economic micromanagement often fails catastrophically. The whiz kids in the regulatory bureau—or megalith corporation’s headquarters—don’t know, despite (or because of?) their educations, that the valve on the widget plant’s number-six boiler gives off a high-pitched whine right before it blows a seal, or that you have to whack it with a wrench when it sticks in freezing weather, or a dozen other facts that make the local engineer the best judge of how to run it safely and efficiently, until the geniuses in central command bury him under procedures, or replace him with someone who has more education, the chief effect of which is a willingness to follow procedures without asking questions.
Polanyi discerned, further, that discovery often occurs in flashes of insight, when multiple ideas and observations converge in a brief and blissful brain symphony. Entranced by his epiphany, the scientist applies the tools of his trade to prove it was not a mirage.
Polanyi counterposed this holistic envisioning against the reductionism that is characteristic of the small-minded, be they scientists, government officials, corporate chieftains, or even people unencumbered by advanced degrees.
As a schoolboy, I was taught that “the scientific process” means dispassionate, reductionist hypothesis-exploration. You break things into parts and analyze each in turn to understand them.
Perhaps not coincidentally, this was when I grew bored with science—and most other classroom subjects for that matter. I preferred novels, where big, interrelated, utterly unexpected things can happen on any page. Unless one is reading Danielle Steel.
I think more serious teaching of literature—by teachers who read, if there are enough of them to go around—would make for better scientists. This is no doubt a counter-intuitive notion to those utilitarian technocrats busily displacing fine arts with computer labs.
Literature engenders wild and independent thought. It prepares the mind—as prayer cultivates the heart—for epiphany. Epiphany is the chief enemy of intellectual orthodoxy, and reductionism, and rote procedure.
Which I don’t suspect will make my case with the technocrats.
Maybe technocrats run the world, so who am I to spare a child an opportunity to join their ranks? Schools now proudly embrace a utilitarian ethos (How will this resource get as many children as possible to the next level?).
Political parties, meanwhile, are havens for technocrats; their bombast is only proof (Which bold statement will shift as many undecideds to our camp, solidify our core, yet run little risk of mobilizing our opponents?)
And churches? You need only peruse the multiplicity of titles on church growth and giving-unit cultivation to glimpse what the Dewey decimal system spans in Hell. (Because make no mistake, in Hell they use the Dewey decimal system.)
Maybe technocrats run the world, but they possess none of the power to change it, at least not for the better. This will fall to people who read and think and pray well, and who, I suspect, would have made very bad computer-lab students.
All of which means those nights I read to my children aren’t small things, but potential revolutionary acts. With any luck, they’ll draw protests from the gathered experts themselves one day.

























Thank you for your thoughtful reply. I think Polanyi would push back at your contention that good science cannot be subject to personal bias. He would argue, I think, that a scientist doesn't really engage an idea until he has a personal bias, that knowledge itself is frequently personal, rooted in insights that can't at first be articulated. This initial, highly personal epiphany is what drives the scientist to attempt to prove or disprove something.
The way science avoids going off the rails despite (actually, by virtue of) a multiplicity of personal biases is by means of what Polanyi called "the Republic of Science," which is to say a decentralized interplay of dissenting voices. (You can read his essay on it here: http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/~gsd/595e/docs/41.%20Polanyi_Republic_of_Science.pdf)
Good science, in other words, depends on personal bias, within a system of free inquiry. Which is one reason he reviled the Soviets and Nazis, because they sought to centralize scientific inquiry and make it service their totalitarian ends.
You're right about E.O. Wilson, which is what makes his recent reversal so fascinating (or infuriating, depending on one's point of view).
I think we may be using “personal bias” differently.
I am referring to the investment of the ego in a particular hypothesis, the scientist who says “This idea must be borne out in my work” as opposed to “This idea may be borne out in my work.” It sounds as though you are referring to what the scientist finds particularly interesting as their personal bias. “The line of greatest excitement..”, the family member who died of a particular disease, the first glimpse of the stars, these things propel people to become scientists and pursue particular questions.
But, as enraptured as they may be with a subject, the questions they ask need to be honest inquiries rather than quests for validation. And if that honest inquiry returns an answer other than expected, the scientist must be able to re-evaluate their hypothesis in light of the new evidence (unbiased consideration of the information at hand). In the same way that institutional constraints on what may be studied are detrimental, an individual’s constraints on what the data may or may not tell him is just as poisonous to the scientific process.
This process, the dispassionate, reductionist, hypothesis driven work, is what your teacher was describing. It’s Polanyi’s “dynamic orthodoxy”, a rigid set of rules for the inquiry and a rigid set of criteria to determine the value of the postulate put forth (in fact, I’d argue that over 50 years almost nothing has changed there). This then “acts as a guide in the search of truth, implicitly granting the right to opposition in the name of truth.”
While the process may be fairly rigidly bound, people involved in the work are certainly passionate, and the questions being answered are often far reaching, even if they begin with the determination of the function of a single molecule. Jacob and Monod found the first repressor, a protein that binds to DNA, preventing the expression of another protein in 1950. In their 1961 Nobel prize speech they outline the potential – from this one, reductionist discovery – for systems which we are still finding support for today, as well as the groundwork for an entirely new field of science. (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1965/jacob-lecture.pdf)
Thank you for providing the link to Polanyi's essay – it’s beautifully written. I particularly love this romantic imagery near the end of the essay: “The Republic of Science is a Society of Explorers.” Dissenting voices are certainly key to the advancement of science. Without “colleagues who keenly share his aims and sharply control his performances” the scientist would not be so constantly challenged.
However, I would keep in mind that he writes from a very different time, particularly with respect to how the public views the scientific community. The two quotes that caught my eye were “And, indeed, the whole outlook of man on the universe is condition by an implicit recognition of the authority of scientific opinion” and “There is no reason to suppose that an electorate would be less inclined to support science for the purpose of exploring the nature of things, than were the private benefactors who previously supported the universities.” To the first I suggest that there has been a usurpation of the “authority of scientific opinion” to serve the purposes of whatever rhetorical argument is being put forth. To the second, I find myself amazed that there was ever a time when the American public would be happy to give taxpayer dollars to a research lab, confident in the knowledge that whatever the scientists chose to study, it would be the best question to answer and be carried out the most efficient way possible. This certainly isn't the case anymore.
I find it interesting that you segue from Polanyi’s argument that knowledge is tacit to a repudiation of micromanagement. From your example, that appears to be synonymous with regulation. Do you support the removal of micromanagement or regulation from scientific pursuits?
Thanks for taking the time to have this conversation! I’d be very curious to see E.O. Willson’s retraction – I haven’t heard anything about it. Would you mind providing a link?
Thanks again,
Keira